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Abstract
Policies to incentivize the adoption of renewable energy sources (RES) usually offer
little flexibility to adapt to the varying benefits of those sources at different locations
within the same jurisdiction. In this paper, we propose a general framework to evaluate
the geographical misallocation of RES that is potentially caused by the uniform nature
of feed-in-tariffs (FiT). After estimating the dispersion of the marginal benefits from
solar production in Germany, we compute the social and private costs from the current
configuration of residential solar photovoltaic (PV) plants relative to a reallocation sce-
nario in which regions with a higher PV average productivity are given higher amounts
of solar capacity, while keeping the system’s total capacity fixed. We find that a 20%
solar installation rate and with a conservative value for the social cost of carbon, the
total value of solar PV would increase by about 5% relative to the current allocation.
In addition, we estimate the size of the transmission capacity between the North and
the South of Germany implied by the differences in marginal costs across those regions.
Reallocating solar capacity with the possibility of exporting surpluses from the South
to the North would yield gains that range from 14 to 22% depending on the rate of
solar penetration. A benefit-cost analysis shows that additional transmission can be
beneficial if there is sufficient RES capacity reallocated across regions.
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1 Introduction
To many policy-makers, the decision to introduce renewable energy sources (RES) in elec-
tricity markets hinges on the size of its economic impacts: RES are still more costly than
conventional technologies in some regions, they are not perfectly correlated with demand,
their intermittency is problematic (they have a non-negligible unforecastable component),
the storage costs are prohibitively high, and they are non-dispatchable (Baker et al. [2013]).1
Feed-in-Tariffs (FiTs), a widely used policy to incentivize the deployment of RES, does not
necessarily account for the costs and benefits of those technologies. FiTs guarantee a prefer-
ential rate paid to RES producers of electricity, they are regulated by the government, and
specify long-term contracts of about 15 to 20 years. FiTs have been implemented in a number
of jurisdictions including Australia, California, Germany, Ontario, and Spain. Usually the
incentives differ by RES technology, i.e. solar versus wind, but do not account for the relative
productivity of the technology, which largely depends on the specific location of the plant.
This paper provides a framework to quantify empirically the effects of misallocation of
RES, potentially driven by the lack of location-specifc incentives in uniform FiT-type policies.
Our contributions consist of three sets of results. First, making use of an extensive and high-
frequency dataset on electricity production and demand, we measure the benefits from an
additional unit of electricity output from RES due to the displacement of production from
conventional sources in order to satisfy demand. These benefits include the private costs of
production and grid reliability as well as the social costs of the emissions displaced. These
results quantify the heterogeneity in the effects from RES over different subregions from the
same electricity market where a FiT policy has been implemented as a uniform incentive. Our
findings underline the misalignment between the policy design and the heterogeneity of the
RES productivity. Second, we construct a series of counterfactual scenarios in which RES
capacity gets reallocated to maximize its benefits while keeping the total amount of RES
capacity constant within the entire market. We do this by placing capacity from regions
1More specifically, the cost of a technology to produce electricity is measured by the annual equalized
cash flow of costs such that in present value, the sum of those cash flows over the lifetime of a generating plant
with that technology, equals its total costs of production and construction. This is known as the levelized
cost of electricity.
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with low electricity productivity from RES into regions with higher RES productivity. Using
micro-data from photovoltaic installations, we can then simulate the output in each of those
counterfactual scenarios and compare the total gains against those from the actual allocation.
Albeit the gains being positive by construction, it is an empirical question what the magnitude
of such gains is. Third, electricity trade is an important factor in the reallocation of output
from RES and therefore, we calculate the gains from an increase in transmission capacity
between subregions. We compute the shadow cost of transmission and use it to back out
the implied size of the transmission capacity for each level of marginal cost gaps across two
different subregions of the market. Then, we reallocate RES assuming that the transmission
capacity is expanded within that estimated range of capacity and compute the gains from
reallocation for different levels of capacity expansion.
Our work is related to the literature that quantifies the value of the marginal output from
RES (Callaway et al. [2018]), the value of displaced emissions in electricity markets using
the exogeneity of wind and solar output (Abrell et al. [2019a], Cullen [2013], Novan [2015]),
and the costs from the fluctuations in ancillary services due to RES expansions (Tangeras
and Wolak [2019]). Our reallocation counterfactuals have similarities to those in Asker et al.
[2019] for oil extraction and in Sexton et al. [2018] for solar panels. However, our work differs
from the latter in that we use actual solar output data instead of output from a simulation
model, our definition of benefits includes health benefits through the social cost of carbon of
emissions avoided, and the savings from production and ancillary services costs, which has
received little to no attention in the literature.2 In our analysis of misallocation and trade,
we extend the applicability of the methods in Joskow and Tirole [2005] and LaRiviere and
Lu [2017], which contrast with those using natural experiments as in Davis and Hausman
[2016].3
2One exception is Tangeras and Wolak [2019].
3This paper is also related to the challenging task of evaluating different stringency levels of policies
that incentivize the adoption of RES. Reguant [2019] compares Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) and
FiTs focusing on the distributional implications of each policy. Fell and Linn [2013] compare RPS, produc-
tion subsidies, and FiTs using a simulation model but without accounting for uncertainty. Gowrisankaran
et al. [2016] estimate the welfare impacts of RPS for different levels of solar requirements but leaving aside
FiTs. Other studies that focus on tax and subsidy policies in electricity markets include Bahn et al. [2020],
Borenstein [2012], Fowlie et al. [2016], Knittel et al. [2015], and Leslie [2018].
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The analysis in this paper does not attempt to design the optimal structure of a FiT,
but rather to quantify the benefits left on the table given its current structure. Abrell et al.
[2019b] showed that renewable energy support policies such as FiTs can be designed to be as
cost efficient as a carbon price policy.4 However, we show empirically that a quota mandate
in the form of a fraction of the total capacity in the region that should be RES, can also
induce gains in the cost efficiency of RES. More specifically, our paper shows that in the
presence of a flat incentive for RES adoption, the addition of a quota-type policy could have
increased the gains from the costs savings of displacing conventional sources of electricity
and the value of the associated emissions avoided.5
Since most FiT programs have very small or no variation in the amount of the incentive
on output by geographical location or by time of the day, it is an empirical question whether
this corresponds to a lack of variation in the marginal benefits of RES.6 We focus our analysis
on solar power in Germany, which has been the first country to implement large-scale FiTs for
RES. Fell and Linn [2013] call the German case the most prominent example of this policy.7
By concentrating only on solar energy, we provide a conservative measure of the inefficiency
of this policy. The addition of wind capacity to our analysis would at best leave our estimates
unchanged, but otherwise the potential gains from reallocation would increase. While FiTs
have been an effective tool in increasing the penetration of RES, they are also expensive. In
2015 alone the total subsidy accounted for roughly 22 billion euros and financing the subsidy
4See also Wibulpolprasert [2016]. Similarly, in a theoretical exercise, Ambec and Crampes [2019] show
that FiTs can be complemented with a price cap and capacity payments to obtain equivalent outcomes to a
carbon tax.
5The design of these policies can also be tied to a revenue-neutrality constraint in which the taxes levied
on emissions are such that the tax revenue equals the total amount spent in subsidies. We abstract from this
way to design the policy and focus on the costs/benefits from the geographical dispersion of the RES. For an
example of a welfare analysis on a revenue-neutral policy on emissions see Durrmeyer and Samano [2018].
6Borenstein and Bushnell [2018] document how the social marginal costs of electricity in the U.S. are
in some regions above and in others below the retail price of electricity, which shows that if those prices
were to be used for indexing tariffs, they would not correctly account for the potential benefits. Fowlie and
Muller [2019] show through a theory model that under perfect information and heterogeneous damages, a
non-uniform tax policy over damages is welfare improving, but these results turn ambiguous when there is
no perfect information.
7We abstract from other forms of incentives in Germany, particularly for wind production, known as
“technology banding” where there is heterogeneity in the incentives by giving an advantage to producers in
locations with lower output productivity (see Fabra and Montero [2020] for a theoretical analysis).
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has led to an intense political debate about how to distribute the total cost between different
consumer groups (see for instance Gerster and Lamp [2019]). Reducing the misallocation
of RES can have important implications on the effectiveness of FiT policies and potentially
decrease their cost.
We combine high frequency data from the German electricity market on load and supply
from renewable and non-renewable plants for each of the four transmission system operators
(TSOs) together with day-ahead prices, fuel input prices, input-output tables on primary en-
ergy inputs and electricity output, as well as data on ancillary services. All these data sources
are publicly available, which makes our approach widely applicable to other jurisdictions.
The average marginal benefit in each region can be decomposed into three main elements:
displaced emissions, avoided operating costs, and avoided ancillary services. We focus on
solar as the main distributed RES with uniform FiT. Our results show that although the
heterogeneity in average marginal overall benefits across regions ranges only from 41.8 to
44.6 e/MWh, their components contain a larger range of variation. The mean avoided
production costs across TSOs ranges from 19.8 to 29.6 e/MWh. The largest amounts of
avoided emissions do not coincide with the largest savings in operating costs due to the
differences in the technology portfolio mix in each TSO. We use a conservative value for the
social cost of carbon (SCC) of 31.71 e/tCO2 as our main specification, thus our marginal
benefits and the reallocation gains they generate are much larger when using higher values
for the SCC as in Abrell et al. [2019b]. The avoided ancillary costs constitute up to 2% of
the overall marginal benefits but with large standard deviations.
Then we calculate the social and private costs from the potential misallocation of solar PV
plants. We focus on small-scale residential solar installations and perform a counterfactual
allocation of solar PV plants starting in regions with the highest average productivity. We
do this for different values of solar capacity penetration and keeping total solar capacity in
the market constant so that our results reflect solely the effects of reallocation and not of
additions to the system. As the solar penetration increases, more of the existing solar capacity
gets allocated to the regions with the highest average productivity until all the available solar
capacity is placed in one region. Our results show that relatively low penetration rates of
4
25% for reallocation represent approximately 6% of gains in value (ancillary services, avoided
production costs, and avoided emissions combined) relative to the current allocation. Not
surprisingly, these gains are mostly due to the displacement of production costs and avoided
emissions. However, because of the portfolio mix in the TSOs in Germany, avoided production
costs represent a larger fraction of the reallocation gains than the value of displaced emissions
for low values of the penetration rate but this relationship reverses once the allowed amount
of solar capacity within the TSO is increased.
Finally, we contribute on the policy debate concerning the importance of transmission
in the expansion of RES capacity. For this purpose, we split the largest TSO stretching
from North to South Germany into two parts, with different average solar productivity,
making the South region a net exporter of solar to the North region. We estimate that the
average transmission capacity consistent with the observed gap in marginal costs across the
two subregions is 3 GW, which is in line with current projects under construction.8 Then,
in a second step, we perform a counterfactual allocation of total installed solar capacity in
Germany, taking into account the transmission constraint that allows the South region to
export solar electricity to the North. We show that the gains from reallocation range from
14% to 22% depending on the rate of solar penetration. Using projected costs figures, we
conclude that the net benefits of the project can be positive, even without accounting for
other forms of RES or other interconnections.9
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide details on the institutional
background. In section 3 and section 4 we describe the data and the quantitative results in
detail. In section 5 we present the main results on the misallocation of solar capacity and
the value of expansions in transmission capacity. Finally, section 6 concludes.
8See for instance the network development plan for Germany published in 2019, NEP 2030.
9The decrease in marginal costs across the two regions is a form of the effect of transmission expansions
on competitiveness as in Wolak [2015].
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2 Institutional Context
Germany was the first country to implement large-scale FiTs as part of the Erneuerbare
Energien Gesetz (Renewable Energy Act) in 2000. FiTs can differ by installation size and
type, but are otherwise uniform for each type of RES technology, not taking into account
regional differences in sunshine radiation nor regional differences in electricity demand.
Figure 1: Evolution of FiTs for Solar (Germany)
Notes: Taken from Fraunhofer ISE (2018).
Figure 1 plots the evolution of FiTs for solar systems of different size together with the
average electricity price paid by the residential and industry sectors for the years 2000 to
2017. While the overall FiTs have decreased significantly in this time period, mimicking the
evolution of technology cost, the average FiT remains at about 30 euro-cents per kilowatt-
hour (kWh). The large difference between costs for new installations and the average FiT
stems from the fact that rates are set at the point in time when the installation is first
time connected to the grid and guaranteed for 20 years. Rates for PV systems depend on
system size and mounting. While recent reforms of the Renewable Energy Act have led to
the introduction of renewable capacity auctions, smaller residential installations continue to
receive FiT even after 2014.10
10The timing of ‘entry’ of new PV plants is mainly related to the national FiT policy rather than regional
factors. We confirm this by plotting the share of new solar installations in each region relative to the total
number of solar installations within the corresponding TSO over the period 2000-16 and we do not find any
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Figure 2 displays the total variation in sunshine radiation, installed solar capacity, and
electricity demand in Germany. While there is clearly more solar radiation in Southern
Germany, we find most of the installed capacity in North-West and North-East Germany.11
An ideal policy would have likely led to a larger amount of installed solar capacity in the
South. Figure 2c shows that total electricity demand −residential, commercial, and indus-
trial combined− also varies across regions, but it does so without a good overlapping with
solar radiation nor with installed solar capacity. The question is thus whether the dispersion
in potential productivity of installations aligns with the dispersion in marginal benefits. If
this is not the case, it is of interest to quantify the value left on the table from installing pan-
els in regions with low solar productivity instead of installing more solar capacity in regions
where the panels would be more productive.
Figure 2: Regional Variation in Solar Radiation, Solar Installations and Electricity Demand
(a) Global solar radiation. (b) Installed solar capacity.
Solar	capacity	(MW)
5.1	-	61.1
61.1	-	117.2
117.2	-	173.2
173.2	-	229.3
229.3	-	285.3
285.3	-	341.4
341.4	-	397.4
397.4	-	453.5
Legend
(c) Electricity Demand.
Federal	States
Electricity	Demand	(TWh)
5	-	22
22	-	39
39	-	56
56	-	73
73	-	90
90	-	107
107	-	124
124	-	141
Legend
Notes: Global solar radiation (long-term averages) measured in kWh / m2 in Panel 2a, cumulative
solar capacity (Dec 2016) in Panel 2b, and electricity demand (2015) at state level in Panel 2c.
Darker areas represent higher solar radiation, more installed capacity, and higher electricity demand,
respectively. Data sources: German Weather Service, Official RES registry, and Statistical Offices
of the German States, respectively.
evidence of regional differences in installation timing. These series of plots are available upon request.
11We provide the total solar capacity for residential installations (< 10kW) in Appendix Figure A.2.
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3 Data
Our primary data sources are publicly available data from the German electricity market. We
obtain high-frequency data on load and supply from renewables and non-renewable plants
for each of the four regulatory zones that are served by one of the Transmission System
Operators (TSOs) in Germany for the years 2015 and 2016. The four TSOs are 50Hertz,
Amprion, TenneT, and TransnetBW. These data were obtained from the European Network
of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and are available at the 15-
minute interval and for each type of production technology. Then, we combined these data
with wholesale prices for Germany from the day-ahead market (EPEX) available at the hourly
frequency.
To calculate the daily electricity production costs by technology (coal, natural gas, fuel
oil), we enrich these data with detailed fuel prices for Germany obtained from Bloomberg and
official input-output tables from the working group on energy balances (AG Energiebilanzen)
to determine the conversion factors from primary energy to electricity. These data allow us
to calculate electricity production costs as well as emission factors by technology. We do
not employ wholesale electricity price data because it does not necessarily reflect the cost of
production as market power may be an important component of the observed price levels.12
Instead, we obtain the marginal cost for each time period as described in the next section.
Therefore, our results do not reflect issues related to market power.
We also use data on the type, quantity, and cost of ancillary services at the TSO level.
These data are available from the official tender platform at 15-minute intervals and describe
the procurement of primary and secondary control reserves.13 While system balancing takes
place at the TSO level, there exists one common price for ancillary services in Germany.
To gain some intuition on the effects of RES production on the rest of the system’s
production, Figure 3 plots the average residual system load (load net of solar) for the first six
12In addition, since there is a uniform wholesale electricity price for Germany, this price does not allow
to disentangle regional differences in electricity supply and demand. TSOs are, for example, responsible for
grid balancing in their area and congestion between the TSOs might lead to differences in marginal costs of
production.
13http://regelleistung.net
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months of 2015 together with one-standard deviation bands. There are several facts worth
noting. First, electricity demand in Germany is higher in winter than in summer, which is
mainly related to demand for electric heating. Second, the production profile of solar can
lead to the well documented “energy duck curve”. The double-hump shape is associated
with the risk of RES over-generation during day-hours and the need for ramp-up at peak
demand in the evening.14 Finally, peak demand might shift to earlier hours in the summer.
This exemplifies the variability in load caused by the introduction of renewables. Without
them, the load profiles would be smoother and so would the ancillary services required. The
repetition of the peak-cycle in one single day suggests a repetition of costs to maintain grid
reliability. This will be quantified in the marginal ancillary costs at hourly level discussed in
the next section.
Figure 3: Load Profiles Net of Solar
30
45
60
75
GW
0 5 10 15 20 25
hour
Month: 1
30
45
60
75
GW
0 5 10 15 20 25
hour
Month: 2
30
45
60
75
GW
0 5 10 15 20 25
hour
Month: 3
30
45
60
75
GW
0 5 10 15 20 25
hour
Month: 4
30
45
60
75
GW
0 5 10 15 20 25
hour
Month: 5
30
45
60
75
GW
0 5 10 15 20 25
hour
Month: 6
Load net of solar. Mean and S.D. bands
Notes: Each panel shows the hourly mean and standard deviation for load minus solar output
in Germany. To facilitate the exposition we show only the first six months of 2015-16 combined.
(January on the top left and April on the bottom left panel).
Figure A.3 in the Appendix, on the other hand, plots the average portfolio mix by TSO for
the years 2015 and 2016. This graph documents clearly the heterogeneity in the production
14Similar patterns have been documented by Bushnell and Novan [2018] and Jha and Leslie [2019] in
solar-rich jurisdictions.
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mix. While 50 Hertz and Amprion have a large share of brown coal plants, TransnetBW
shows the largest dependence on nuclear. Our analysis focuses on one well-defined market
and abstracts from imports and exports to Germany. The variability of net load over time
even when aggregated at the national level and the diversity in the portfolio mix across the
different TSOs, suggest that not only the marginal benefits in each of those regions can be
different but also over time.
We complement the aggregated data at the TSO level with several disaggregated data
sources. First, we obtain disaggregate data on all solar installations in Germany that are
subject to FiTs.15 We complement those data with solar PV production information from
individual residential plants available from PV Output that provides us with the power
produced at the PV station level at 15-minute intervals for a subset of all plants across
Germany. More importantly, individual solar PV production data allow us to take into
account plant heterogeneity in production (due to panel orientation, number and type of
inverter, shading, etc.) and to have a distribution of solar PV output by TSO. Figure 4 shows
the four TSOs and the location of the individual solar PV production plants in our dataset.
Second, we obtain data on the location, technology, and installed capacity of conventional
power plants in Germany from the Open Power System Data platform, which, in turn, are
based on official statistics from the German Environmental Agency and the Federal Ministry
for Economic Affairs and Energy. For all plants with an installed capacity of 100 MW or
more, we furthermore obtain the history of plant unavailability and plant outages, which
is available from the ENTSO-E at the 15-minute interval. Finally, we further complement
our dataset with additional regional statistics on population, economic output, and energy
demand from the Statistical Offices of the 16 states in Germany.
4 Quantifying the Marginal Benefits
We start our analysis by computing a measure of the value of an additional unit of electricity
produced by RES. This is based on a combination of the short-term social and private costs
15These data are available from the network transmission operator Netztransparenz.de.
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Figure 4: TSO Service Areas with Solar PV plants (≤ 10 kW).
Notes: Each blue dot represents a residential solar PV installation (installed capacity ≤ 10 kW) for
which we observe electricity generation data at high frequency. Data obtained from PVoutput.org.
associated with non-RES production. We separate the marginal benefits (MB) from one
unit of production of electricity from renewables at region j and time t as:
MBjt = value of displaced emissionsjt
+avoided operating costsjt
±avoided ancillary service costsjt
in a similar manner as in Callaway et al. [2018]. The first component captures the social costs
and the last two the private costs. Our final goal from this part of the analysis is to compare
the distribution of MBjt against the uniform nature of the FiT incentive. We abstract from
capacity markets as Germany is an “energy-only market”, in which only produced power is
compensated.16
The avoided operating costs are the savings from the last MWh produced by the marginal
plant that is no longer needed if RES output can replace it. Then, as pointed out in Callaway
et al. [2018], the avoided operating costs can be expressed as a correlation of marginal costs
16See for instance a White Paper (2015) published by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Energy arguing against the introduction of capacity markets in a foreseeable future in Germany.
11
and RES output. Let λjt be the marginal cost in region j at time t and let ωjt be the RES
output at time t divided by the total RES production in a time interval [0, T ]. Then, using
the values of ωjt as the realizations of the probability density of the RES output we obtain
that the average avoided operating costs per time period are
E[avoided operating costsj] =
T∑
t=1
ωjtλjt = λj + T × Cov(ωj, λj),
where λ¯j is the expected value of λjt and we use the fact that
∑
t ωjt = 1. That expression
makes clear that the weighted sum of marginal costs can be expressed as the average of
marginal costs in region j and a term that depends on the correlation between marginal
costs and solar output. The higher this correlation, the higher the value of avoided operating
costs. Therefore, the geographical location of both the RES installation and the conventional
sources is an important component of their value.
The same arithmetic applies to the case of emissions. Let ejt be the emissions of the
marginal plant at time t in region j. Then
E[displaced emissionsj] =
T∑
t=1
ωjtejt = ej + T × Cov(ωj, ej),
where e¯j is the expected value of ejt. This shows that a positive correlation of emissions and
RES output increases the value of the displaced emissions. Therefore, the correlations in
both cases can be increased by inducing higher installation rates in regions with higher solar
productivity, higher emitting plants, and higher marginal costs.
The ancillary services costs would follow a similar valuation if the marginal cost of this
production were known. However, the typical data for this component are of a different
nature and we propose a new approach to account for these savings in subsection 4.2.
4.1 Avoided operating costs and emissions
For each 15-minute time interval t we sort the technologies by their marginal cost and form
the perfectly competitive supply curve, i.e. the system’s marginal cost. Then we intersect
that curve with the demand at time t and store the value of the marginal cost associated
to the technology at that intersection. We call that marginal cost λjt, where j identifies the
12
TSO. The underlying assumption is that load is dispatched by minimizing production costs.17
Notice that this assumption on the ranking of the technologies to be dispatched (merit-order)
makes sense even in the presence of market power as long as there is not strategic withholding,
which would clearly change the order of the dispatched plants. We elaborate on the detailed
procedure in Appendix section A.1. Table 1 shows the resulting simulated frequencies of
the marginal technologies for the years 2015 and 2016 and Figure 5 the distribution of the
marginal costs for each of the four TSOs. Consistent with other electricity markets, natural
gas plants are the most frequent to be the marginal technology (62% of the time) followed
by hard coal (36%) and then the rest of the technologies each with less than 2% of the time.
The marginal costs distribution for TransnetBW is shifted to the left with respect to the
other three TSOs in part because of its large share of nuclear capacity (the largest among
the four TSOs).
In contrast to previous studies that focus on the German electricity market using an
optimization problem [see for instance Abrell et al., 2019b], our fully data-driven approach
allows us us to exploit several years of highly disaggregate data at the 15-minute level.
Table 1: Simulated Frequencies of Marginal Technologies
Source Freq. Percent
Natural Gas 172,501 61.45
Hard Coal 100,765 35.90
Nuclear 3,522 1.25
Oil 3,187 1.14
Brown Coal / Lignite 655 0.23
Hydro: River 46 0.02
Hydro: Pumped storage 24 0.01
Biomass 4 0.00
Notes: For each 15-minute interval of the day we compute the marginal cost of each of the technolo-
gies shown in the table, we sort them from lowest to highest marginal cost to obtain the system’s
marginal cost curve. Notice that the marginal cost for fossil fuels can change over time as we use
fuel prices data to construct this curve. Finally, we select the technology that corresponds to the
point in the marginal cost curve that intersects the net load in that time interval.
17We make the implicit assumption that each TSO balances demand and supply independently and that
there is no interconnection between the entities. We relax this assumption in subsection 5.2, where we
elaborate on transmission capacity between regions.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Marginal Operating Costs by TSO
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Notes: Each panel shows the histogram of λjt for a given TSO j.
Since we stored the identity of the marginal technology for each time interval, we can
also compute the avoided emissions from those marginal plants. Then we use a social cost of
carbon (SCC) of 31.71 e/tCO2 as our baseline valuation to transform these emissions into
euros per MWh.18 We show the summary statistics of the avoided emissions multiplied by
our baseline SCC value in the fourth column of Table 3. We also consider two higher values
for the SCC, 50 and 100 e/tCO2, which correspond to the two scenarios in Abrell et al.
[2019b]. All our results are obtained using an SCC value of 31.71 e/tCO2 unless otherwise
specified. This places all of our results on the conservative side of RES valuations.
18The SCC is designed to measure climate change damages and includes effects on human health, agricul-
tural output, property damages from flood risk, and changes in heating and air-conditioning costs. See EPA
fact sheet. We chose the SCC in the US of 36 $/tCO2 at a discount rate of 3% annual for year 2015. This
value is equivalent to 31.71 e/tCO2 using an average of the exchange rate between the two currencies of 0.88
dollars per euro. The last two times this exchange rate applied were at the end of December 2019 and at the
end of March 2020.
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4.2 Ancillary services costs and renewables
The third component in our marginal benefits calculation has received little attention in the
literature. One exception is Tangeras and Wolak [2019] who use a kernel regression to find
the effect of renewables output on ancillary costs in California. Their results show that the
effect can change signs depending on the amount of load and renewables. We opt for a new
approach to estimate this effect that will allow us to reduce the computational burden of our
reallocation simulations in the next section.
First, we cluster our data on categories of load profiles. To do so, we use the k−means clus-
tering method, which is an unsupervised machine learning algorithm. Similarly approaches
have been used by Reguant [2019], Bahn et al. [2020], and Green et al. [2011]. We define
a data point as the vector of all the observed load amounts in one day aggregated at the
hourly level and at the TSO level. To this vector we add an additional entry equal to the
maximum of those 24 elements. The k−means clustering algorithm starts with k randomly
chosen points and attempts to classify the remaining observations by the proximity to those
initial points: each observation gets assigned to the closest of the k initial points. We use the
Euclidian distance in our implementation and several different initial points to make sure our
clusters are robust to that initial choice. Figure 6 shows the mean and standard deviation
bands for each of the clusters in each TSO. We determine the number of clusters (k = 3) as
the maximum value of k such that the standard deviation bands do not overlap for most of
the hours in each TSO.
Then, for each of the clusters we estimate the relationship between the ancillary costs on
solar output and load using a cubic polynomial that includes all the terms up to degree three
including interactions. In addition, we include two-way fixed effects FEs of TSO, hour of
the day, day of the week, month, and year as follows,
ASt(Rt, Qt) = a0 + a1Rt + a2R
2 + a3R
3 + a4Qt + a5Q
2
t + a6Q
3
t +
+ a7RtQt + a8RtQ
2
t + a9R
2
tQt + FE.
where ai are the parameters to estimate, Rt is the renewable output and Qt the total load
at time t. The marginal effect from an increase in renewable output on expected ancillary
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Figure 6: Clusters of Load Profiles by TSO
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Notes: The labelling of the clusters is consistent across the four panels: cluster 1 is identified by
the filled circles markers, cluster 2 by the hollow triangles, and cluster 3 by the hollow circles. The
range of vertical axes is different in each panel to ease readability. The number of clusters (k = 3)
is the maximum value of k such that the standard deviation bands do not overlap for most of the
hours in each TSO.
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services is the derivative of the expression above with respect to Rt. We estimate this equation
for each of the different clusters of load profiles.
We present the regression results in Appendix Table A.2. In these regressions we only
include observations for which solar output is positive since otherwise the ancillary services
are not related to solar production. Using these estimates we can compute the derivative of
the ancillary services with respect to solar output and we evaluate it at each different time
observation in our sample. This heterogeneity is used later in the paper when we calculate
overall marginal benefits under different scenarios. Table 2 shows the mean of the values of
such derivatives when evaluated at each of the time intervals in our sample. When these
derivatives are evaluated at the mean values of load, we obtain quadratic functions that take
on negative values for solar output of less than 1,800 MWh and positive values for larger
output levels. Figure A.4 in the Appendix shows these relationships. While there are usually
benefits related to some solar production in the electricity system, ancillary service costs
increase as more solar needs to be connected to the grid; yet the exact response depends on
an interplay of load and solar output. This finding is in line with Tangeras and Wolak [2019].
Table 2: Effect of Solar Output on Ancillary Services
∂AS/∂R
TSO cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 3
50Hertz −1.21 −0.19 0.29
Amprion 0.91 0.56 −0.80
TenneT −0.19 −0.11 −0.87
TransnetBW −1.83 1.98 −0.20
Notes: Each number in the table, in e/ MWh, is the arithmetic mean of the values of ∂AS/∂R
when this derivative is evaluated at each 15-minute observation using the coefficients in Table A.2.
We present in the Appendix Table A.3 the results from a quadratic and a cubic specifi-
cations for ASt(Rt, Qt) when pooling all the observations instead of running different regres-
sions by clusters. There, it is evident that by pooling all the observations, there is a loss of
heterogeneity of the value of the derivative of interest and fewer coefficients are statistically
significant. Therefore, we choose the specification that uses clusters as our main specification.
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4.3 Total marginal benefits
The total expected value of the marginal benefits are shown in Table 3. As pointed out in
the computation for each of the components of marginal benefits, there is a different value at
each 15-minute interval and for each TSO. To simplify the exposition of these results we opt
for showing the simple arithmetic means and the standard deviations only. There are several
things worth noting. First, the avoided operating cost accounts, on average, for between
44% and 67% of the total marginal benefits. Second, the marginal effect of ancillary services
with respect to renewables is small compared to the other two components. However, these
are non-negligible amounts in the aggregate and they are all positive on average but with
high volatility. This surprising result is supported by the broader trend in ancillary services
and RES. While over the time period 2008 to 2015 wind and solar capacity have augmented
roughly by 200% in Germany, the total amount of balancing reserves has decreased by 20%.19
Finally, our results show heterogeneity for the four main regions as measured by the standard
deviations of the marginal benefits.
Table 3: Expected Value and Standard Deviation of Marginal Benefits
avoided ancillary avoided avoided total
costs operating costs emissions
TSO (e/MWh) (e/MWh) (e/MWh) (e/MWh)
Amprion 0.01 29.43 12.39 41.83
(1.53) (6.3) (2.04) (6.18)
TenneT 0.46 22.53 21.59 44.58
(1.08) (9.94) (7.28) (7.93)
TransnetBW 0.80 19.76 23.37 43.93
(1.64) (13.23) (7.68) (16.48)
50Hertz 0.53 29.62 12.14 42.29
(1.07) (6.38) (1.02) (6.49)
Notes: The first three columns of results show each of the averages and standard deviations (in
parentheses) of each of the components of marginal benefits. The last column contains the overall
average and standard deviation (in parentheses) by TSO.
19Lion Hirth, ‘Balancing power 2015’, Neon Energie, last accessed online 12 June 2019.
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5 Measuring Misallocation
In this section we measure the misallocation resulting from the current solar panel instal-
lations locations using our estimated measures for the marginal benefits and a ranking of
TSOs with respect to their solar productivity −defined as solar output per unit of installed
capacity−. A different approach is to allocate solar according to the ranking of the average
expected marginal benefits from Table 3. Yet, this measure does not take into account the
misallocation resulting from differences in solar radiation.20 We exploit the heterogeneity
in regional solar radiation to calculate a counterfactual allocation of solar installations in
Germany such that regions with the highest productivity are assigned a larger amount of
these installations. We focus on small scale residential solar installations in this setup. We
compare this counterfactual allocation’s output and total benefits to the output and benefits
from the actual location of PV installations. Our measure of misallocation is the ratio of
the two total benefit values from each scenario, where the value is based on the expected
marginal benefits of solar in each region.
5.1 Reallocating RES
We start by computing the value of the actual solar allocation: each unit of observed solar
output is valued at the MBjt (different every 15-min in each TSO) and we take the sum
over our sample period. This is the baseline value used below to compute the gains of
each reallocation. Then we rank the TSOs by the productivity of their solar installations.
Some regions with high solar radiation levels may have small levels of capacity installed and
therefore, their output per unit of capacity is relatively high, which calls for an expansion of
their installed capacity.
To determine the average solar productivity per TSO, we use individual solar plant-
level production data aggregated at the annual level. We observe the production profile for
approximately 240 stations in Germany during 2015 and 2016. Table 4 shows the results from
20Moreover, the ranking implied by the expected marginal benefits can change with the reallocation. Using
an ex-ante fixed ranking, based on an exogenous characteristic, such as average solar radiation, overcomes
this problem.
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linear regressions without a constant of the annual output in kWh per kW of capacity installed
on the set of TSO indicator variables and the characteristics of the solar installations.21 We
condition on year fixed-effects as well as on other PV panels characteristics with the goal to
remove annual differences and the effects from particularities in the mounting of the solar
panels. The coefficients on the TSO dummies measure the average productivity of the PV
sites in each TSO. The table shows that the ranking, with respect to the size of the coefficients,
is consistent across the specifications except for column (1), where we do not condition on
any installation characteristics. Interestingly, the differences in average productivity across
TSOs are not very large, especially when we control for system characteristics. We thus rely
on columns (2) and (3) to define our ranking. In line with these estimates, residential solar
plants are more productive in TransnetBW, followed by Amprion, 50 Hertz, and TenneT.
With this ranking at hand, we define γ as the maximum share of total capacity that is
allowed to be covered with solar capacity in a given TSO. The interpretation of γ is therefore
similar to that of a Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). However, instead of a mandate on
the fraction of load to be covered by RES production, we define γ as a fraction of installed
capacity and as a maximum share of total capacity, not a minimum.
Let S be the total amount of currently installed residential solar capacity in all the TSOs
together. For a given value of γ we reallocate S as follows:
1. Add γ× (total capacity in the TSO with the highest average productivity) to the
capacity of this TSO.
2. If S has not yet been depleted, add γ× (total capacity in the TSO with the second
highest productivity) of capacity to this TSO.
3. If S has not yet been depleted, add γ× (total capacity in the TSO with the third
highest productivity) of capacity to this TSO.
4. Continue until S has been completely reallocated.
21The estimated average productivity per TSO is in line with PV simulation models, e.g. as available
online from the European Commission.
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Table 4: Ranking of TSOs by Output per Unit of Capacity Installed
(1) (2) (3)
TransnetBW 907.331∗∗∗ 988.127∗∗∗ 1037.727∗∗∗
(31.821) (35.940) (38.489)
Amprion 818.864∗∗∗ 927.586∗∗∗ 971.994∗∗∗
(22.174) (30.437) (32.935)
50 Hertz 820.226∗∗∗ 912.942∗∗∗ 966.330∗∗∗
(33.770) (37.201) (41.332)
TenneT 806.680∗∗∗ 894.915∗∗∗ 965.630∗∗∗
(22.579) (28.738) (33.769)
Controls:
Year X X X
Panel orientation X X
Panel shading X X
Inverter size X X
Panel tilt X
N 485 485 464
R2 0.920 0.928 0.930
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Dependent variable: output in kWh per kW of capacity installed. Control variables are
included as categorial variables. The reference (omitted) category in column 2 are South facing solar
plants with no shading and a large inverter size ( > 7000 Watts). Column 3 additionally conditions
on tilt (15-40 degrees as omitted category). For each column, the magnitude of the coefficients
define the ranking in solar productivity.
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For the reallocation we rely on the observed output from the individual solar PV stations
in each TSO and multiply it with a daily weight so that the sum of the output of all the
stations in our sample is equivalent to the observed aggregated total TSO output. This allows
us to obtain a distribution of gains in each TSO. We elaborate on the detailed algorithm in
Appendix section A.1 where we also present a numerical example. We use the MB at the 15-
min interval and TSO levels to multiply the newly allocated solar output in each TSO. When
doing so, the effect on the ancillary services may change signs and large RES penetration
rates could be associated with increases in the costs of these services. Although unlikely, if
solar output from residential installations was enough to cover total load in the TSO, only
the units needed to satisfy demand are valued at the MBs since the surplus does not displace
any traditional technology. This occurs less than 0.01% of the times in our sample. When
we introduce the possibility of transmission in subsection 5.2, the surplus will be valued at
the MB of the importer of this excess.
Our results consist of reallocating only residential solar installation plants of no more
than 10 kW of capacity. We set the minimum value for γ to be 0.0725 so that gains from
reallocation are always positive in the benchmark case. A lower value of γ would imply that
S is not fully reallocated among the four TSOs, leaving a fraction of S unused after allocating
solar capacity in the least productive region. This would yield an inefficient allocation.
Our main outcome of interest is the ratio
Reallocation value = 100×
(
value of reallocated solar capacity
value of current allocation of solar capacity
− 1
)
(1)
for a given value of γ. Therefore, when γ is small, we should have gains close to 0. Figure 7
shows the reallocation values expressed as percentages and for different values of γ and of the
SCC. As the parameter γ increases, more of the existing solar capacity gets allocated to the
most productive regions until all the existing capacity is placed in the region that is the most
productive. At that point, increasing γ has no further effect since we are not adding extra
solar capacity to the system, we are simply reallocating the existing capacity. We anchor the
initial value of γ so that the gains are zero for our base value of the SCC. Interestingly, using
larger values of the SCC increases the gains for medium to large values of γ but it results in
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negative gains for low values of γ, which are related to the portfolio mix of the TSOs that
are assigned more solar capacity. Recall that the ranking for the reallocation is based on
the average solar productivity, which might not coincide with the expected value of marginal
benefits or levels of emissions at the margin (Table 3). Therefore, if we displace a large
amount of conventional production in a low-emitting TSO, the overall gains are negative for
low values of γ. On the other hand, as the rate of solar penetration increases, the gains are
positive and larger in magnitude than in the baseline case with these higher values of the
SCC.
To provide confidence intervals for our main estimates, for each value of γ we bootstrap
25 samples of the set of PV installations with replacement within each TSO and compute
the gains from reallocation for each sample. In addition, to account for the uncertainty in
demand, we regress load on its 1-hour lagged value and its 24-hours lagged value together
with TSO, hour of the day, day of the week, month, and year dummy variables. We recover
the residuals from this regression and calculate their standard deviations by TSO. At random,
we add or subtract one standard deviation to the load before each one of the bootstrapped
samples and compute the gains from reallocation. The bands around the main line in Figure 7
represent the 10th and the 90th percentiles of the bootstrapped samples. Consistent with the
regressions above on average productivity, we see almost no uncertainty in the gains. This
is mainly driven by the fact that most residential installations (in a given TSO) are rather
homogeneous and produce similar output. For higher values of the SCC, the uncertainty
bands are as narrow as in the baseline case because the variability in output and demand
does not change.
These results show that relatively low penetration rates of γ = 20% for reallocation repre-
sent between 4.5 and 5.2% of gains in value (avoided ancillary services + avoided production
costs + avoided emissions) relative to the actual allocation using our baseline value of the
SCC. These percentage changes may seem small. To put these changes in perspective, the
increase in levels from the baseline to the reallocation configuration when γ = 0.2 is 79.7
million euros and 106.7 million euros when γ = 0.3. The first amount (79.7 million euros) is
roughly equivalent to the production of 200,000 residential PV plants of average size valued
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Figure 7: Value of Reallocation for Different Values of γ
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Notes: Each line represents the value of reallocated solar capacity as defined in Equation 1. For
each value of γ we bootstrap 25 samples of the set of PV installations with replacement within each
TSO and account for demand uncertainty (see main text for details) and then compute the gains
from reallocation for each of the samples. The bands around the main line represent the 10th and
90th percentiles of gains from the bootstrapped samples.
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at an average wholesale electricity price of 30.30 e/MWh during our sample period, and
to 267,000 PV plants of the same capacity when γ = 0.3.22 In 2016, there were roughly
950,000 residential installations in Germany, therefore these values from misallocation rep-
resent approximately 21% and 28% of the market value of the production of all residential
installations, respectively.
All these results use a relatively conservative measure of SCC. With a higher valuation of
50 e/tCO2 as in the main specification in Abrell et al. [2019b], the gains from reallocation are
about 7.5 and 12% when γ = 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. For a value of SCC of 100 e/tCO2
as in the second specification in Abrell et al. [2019b], those gains are about 12 and 21%
respectively and as shown in Figures 7b and 7c.
It is interesting also to see how the penetration rates change within each TSO as the
reallocation parameter γ increases. As more capacity goes to TSOs with higher solar output
productivity, some TSOs end up without any RES capacity at all. This is shown in Figure 8,
which plots the ratio of the 10 kW-solar capacity with respect to total residential solar
capacity in Germany for each TSO and at different values of γ. For sufficiently high values
of the penetration rate γ, the TSO with the highest solar output productivity has a ratio of
1. The reason is that as the solar rate increases, more and more of the existing solar capacity
gets reallocated to the most productive regions in detriment of the worst regions (total solar
capacity is constant). When the rate γ is relatively high, it is possible to reallocate all the
existing solar capacity into one single TSO, the one with the highest solar output productivity.
The figure also depicts the actual allocation of solar at γ = 0. The vertical line indicates
the minimum γ for which reallocation starts. If γ was below this threshold, only a small
share of solar (smaller than the actual allocation) could be allocated to the TSO with the
highest average productivity, TransnetBW, so more capacity would be installed in the second
best TSO, Amprion and this would generate an inefficient allocation. Similarly, at very small
values of γ there would be an unused amount of solar capacity even after reallocating capacity
among the four TSOs, this would also generate an inefficient allocation.
22The average installation size for residential installation is 6.7 kW. Using the average annual production
in Germany from Table 4 of 984 kWh / kW and the average wholesale electricity price, we find an annual
production value of roughly 200 eper installation and year.
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Figure 8: Ratio of Solar Capacity Relative to Total
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any reallocation.
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While the total gains in Figure 7 are the net result of the combined changes in each of
the three components of the marginal benefits, Figure 9 compares the percentage changes
relative to their benchmark values of each of those components at each value of γ. Figure 10
shows the share of the contribution from each of the components (production costs, emissions,
and ancillary services) to the total gains. For small values of solar penetration, the value of
the emissions displaced shrinks relative to the baseline (negative sign) because some of the
reallocated solar capacity no longer offsets high level emissions marginal plants in some TSOs.
This is in line with the fact that larger values of the SCC lead to negative gains at low levels
of γ in Figure 7. As the solar penetration increases, the size of this displacement is larger
than the total value of offset emissions from the baseline even in low-emitting TSOs. This
is consistent with the portfolio mix of technologies by TSO shown in Figure A.3 and with
the frequencies of marginal technologies in Table A.5. The highest solar output productivity
TSO, TransnetBW, is also the TSO with the largest share of nuclear power, which is a
low-emitting source. At the same time, the other TSOs have large shares of high-emitting
sources, therefore, a reallocation of solar capacity from those TSOs decreases the emissions
until they are offset by the gains in the displacement in low-emitting TSOs, which depends
as well on the relative frequencies of each technology being marginal.23
Production and ancillary services costs are higher than their baseline values when γ is low
since the reallocation places more solar capacity in TSOs that do not necessarily have the
highest marginal benefits. As γ increases we observe a diverging behavior. Production costs
decrease because of the displacement of conventional production even beyond the level of pro-
duction costs from the baseline. However, as γ increases, the ancillary services costs increase.
This is because the ancillary costs as a function of solar output are increasing, therefore, as
more capacity is installed in areas with higher solar output productivity, more solar output
causes higher costs. This is a direct consequence of our estimates in subsection 4.2.
23The relatively high frequencies of hard coal being the marginal technology should not be confused with
the fact that natural gas powered-plants have higher marginal costs. The frequencies shown in Table A.5 are
obtained by solving for the perfectly competitive equilibrium in each time period and low levels of net load
intersect some of the TSOs marginal cost curves at the hard coal production segments more often than at
the natural gas plants. This has been documented by market analysts (see https://timera-energy.com/
german-recession-power-prices-generation-margins/).
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Figure 9: Changes in each Component Relative to Baseline
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
%
 ch
an
ge
 re
lat
ive
 to
 b
as
eli
ne
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
γ
Value of emissions displaced Production costs
Ancillary service costs
Notes: For each component we compute the difference of its value for a given value of γ and
expressed as a percentage relative to the value of that component before any reallocation.
Figure 10 also highlights the trade-off a regulator (social planner) would face when real-
locating solar capacity between evaluating the misallocation using a ranking of the TSOs by
average solar productivity or a ranking based on expected marginal benefits. The former has
for objective to limit production inefficiencies, while the latter is concerned with maximizing
the expected marginal benefits (mainly social value in form of avoided emissions). If the
regulator cares only about increasing the value of emissions displaced, the minimum value
for γ should be approximately 0.13, with preferences for higher values of γ. On the other
hand, at high values of γ the production costs are lower compared to the baseline. Note that
our reallocation simulations allocate solar resources in line with average productivity (solar
radiation), yet it calculates the gains in terms of expected marginal benefits in TSO j at time
interval t. Hence, the reallocation gains take into account both of these elements.
Overall, consistent with Table 3, Figure 10 shows that the two main drivers of the benefits
are the value of emissions displaced and the savings in production costs. Each of these
components account for roughly 40 to 60% of total gains. The savings in ancillary services
costs are much smaller.
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Figure 10: Decomposition of Gains
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Notes: At each value of γ, we compute the fraction of the value of each component relative to the
total gains and express it as percentage.
5.2 The value of transmission
The increasing penetration of RES makes transmission lines more valuable and future in-
vestment in the transmission grid indispensable. This is especially true for large-scale wind
and solar farms. Differences in the availability of RES energy paired with regional differences
in expected energy demand growth led to the creation of the German Network Develop-
ment Plan (Netzentwicklungsplan, NEP) in 2012.24 Key projects discussed in the NEP are
several high-voltage direct current lines between North and South Germany (see Appendix
Figure A.5) with the objective to increase interchange capacity for electricity from RES
production across regions. In particular, the NEP foresees different scenarios for increasing
solar capacity investment in Southern Germany, as well as the development of wind farms
in Northern Germany. While there are clear benefits from an increased interconnection of
these regions, power line expansions have been largely criticized by the public based on their
24Several revisions to the original NEP have been made in recent years. We consider here the 2019 version,
which focuses on the electricity market in 2030, NEP 2030.
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cost and potential environmental and aesthetic impacts.25 Total investment costs for these
large-scale transmission lines are highly project-specific.
We contribute to this ongoing policy debate on the value of transmission, by focusing on
a single TSO, TenneT, that stretches from North to South Germany. In a counterfactual
analysis, we split TenneT into two independent entities, and repeat the calculation of the
marginal benefits from solar in each of these areas. In a second step, we perform a reallocation
focusing on all solar capacity in Germany and allowing for different degrees of transmission
capacity between the two areas to determine the value of transmission.26 In a final step,
we compare the additional benefits from the interconnection to the total investment cost for
different cost scenarios.
Figure 11: TSO Service Areas and Conventional Power Plants
Notes: Each symbol represents a conventional power plant. Markers outside the Germany bound-
aries correspond to hydro power plants under control of one of the TSOs. Data obtained from Open
Power System Data.
25Two key projects are “Suedlink” and “SuedOstlink”, both planned as direct current large-scale regional
interconnections from North to South Germany with an approximate length of 700 km and 530 km, respec-
tively. The projects encountered stark opposition by citizens’ groups, which led to a re-evaluation of the
power lines and the decision to implement them as underground cables. The total cost for these projects are
estimated to be 10 billion euros (Suedlink) and approximately 5 billion euros for SuedOstlink.
26We focus on ‘all’ solar capacity rather than purely residential installations in this subsection to highlight
the role of the transmission constraint.
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We split TenneT based on administrative boundaries in a North and South region.27 We
start our analysis by constructing the expected marginal benefits for solar in the two regions.
As load and electricity production data is only available at the TSO level, we construct
demand and supply in the two subregions as follows.28 Using the exact geo-location for each
plant in TenneT we assign them to the North or South region and assume that their output
is predominantly used in that region (see Figure 11 for conventional power plants).
To determine the average capacity utilization of conventional power plants, we use data
from the US electricity market (Energy Information Agency) and assign these values to the
installed capacity in North and South TenneT. Using data that are external to the Ger-
man market, helps us to overcome potential endogeneity issues that would stem from using
average observed technology shares for the German market. We combine these data with
detailed information on plant unavailability for different generation units in TenneT. These
data are available from ENTSO-E at high frequency for ‘important’ changes in capacity
(changes of 100 MW or more in actual availability) for all technologies. We then can con-
struct hourly supply curves for conventional power plants i using the following formula:
avg. capacity factora ×
∑
i(capacity installedi − capacity unavailablei), by type of technol-
ogy a. For solar production, which is always inframarginal, we observe the total solar output
of all plants in Bavaria at high levels of disaggregation (15-minute) from TenneT. In the
construction of the supply curves, we rely on the same marginal cost ordering that we used
in section 4.
Regarding demand, we use data on the population shares to split total load in TenneT
in the two regions. With the aggregate hourly supply and demand curves for each region,
we can find their intersection to obtain the marginal technology similarly to our analysis
in the previous section. We denote their marginal costs λN for the North and λS for the
South regions, respectively. We provide additional statistics on the marginal cost estimates
for the two regions in TenneT in section A.1 that show that the split leads to values that are
27To split the TSO, we ovelap the TSO area with state boundaries and use the state of Bavaria to define
the South region within TenneT. Bavaria represents roughly half (46%) of the gross domestic product and
about 41% of total population in TenneT.
28ENTSO-E provides high-frequency data at the plant level for conventional power plants. However, in
the case of Germany, these data are available only for large plants with an installed capacity of ≥ 100 MW.
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comparable with those in the previous section.
Before elaborating on the impact of the transmission constraint, we need to find the
updated ranking of the average solar productivity now that there is a total of five TSOs. We
follow the same methodology than in the case before the split and find the correlations of
productivity and the location of the PV sites. Table 5 shows the results. Similarly to the
analysis in the previous section, we use the ranking implied by the coefficients of the indicator
variables for the location of the panels in their corresponding TSO. For consistency with the
results from the previous section, we use the ranking from the specification that includes all
the observed characteristics, column (3). We find that the South region within TenneT is the
second most productive region for PV sites while TenneT-North remains in the last place.
Note that the ranking is robust across all specifications except for small differences between
Amprion and 50Hertz.
To determine the implied transmission capacities, we follow Joskow and Tirole [2005] and
LaRiviere and Lu [2017] and estimate the following regressions (see section A.2 for further
details),
E[λN ] = aN + bN(RN −QN) + cNQS + FEs
E[λS] = aS + bS(RS −QS) + cSQN + FEs
only using time intervals for which the transmission constraint is binding: λN 6= λS. FEs
represent year-month-hour and day fixed-effects. By using only the hours for which the λs are
different in each region we guarantee that the transmission constraint is binding. Therefore,
any increases in load in N should not affect the scheduling of sources in S and viceversa.
This exogenous covariate serves as a valid supply shifter in the estimation of an otherwise
endogenous regression. The expressions above are supply functions since as K (the size of
the capacity constraint) increases, exports increase and more expensive technologies need to
be used: higher λS.
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Based on the results in section A.2 in the Appendix, we find that
capacity imbalancet = ∆Kt =
∆zt
bN − bS , (2)
29Notice that even though LaRiviere and Lu [2017] write price, they are using marginal costs.
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Table 5: Ranking of TSOs by Output per Unit of Capacity Installed When TenneT is Split
(1) (2) (3)
TransnetBW 907.477∗∗∗ 987.803∗∗∗ 1035.926∗∗∗
(31.778) (35.904) (38.583)
TenneT - South 844.045∗∗∗ 927.582∗∗∗ 981.457∗∗∗
(33.269) (36.912) (39.836)
Amprion 819.011∗∗∗ 927.587∗∗∗ 969.952∗∗∗
(22.144) (30.405) (33.064)
50 Hertz 820.374∗∗∗ 912.519∗∗∗ 964.834∗∗∗
(33.724) (37.164) (41.400)
TenneT - North 782.975∗∗∗ 873.537∗∗∗ 951.631∗∗∗
(27.373) (32.476) (38.600)
Controls:
Year X X X
Panel orientation X X
Panel shading X X
Inverter size X X
Panel tilt X
N 485 485 464
R2 0.920 0.928 0.930
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Dependent variable: output in kWh per kW of capacity installed. Control variables are
included as categorial variables. The reference (omitted) category in column 2 are South facing
plants with no shading and a large inverter size ( > 7000 Watts). Column 3 additionally conditions
on tilt (15-40 degrees as omitted category). For each column, the magnitude of the coefficients
define the ranking in solar productivity. More details in the main text.
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Table 6: Estimates of Shadow Costs of Transmission
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gap = 2 e/ MWh Gap = 5 e/ MWh Gap = 8 e/ MWh
λN λS λN λS λN λS
RN −QN −0.000737 −0.000761 −0.000434
(0.000481) (0.000491) (0.000505)
QS −0.00110 −0.00126 −0.00152
(0.00117) (0.00118) (0.00124)
RS −QS −0.00769∗∗∗ −0.00783∗∗∗ −0.00791∗∗∗
(0.000616) (0.000632) (0.000687)
QN 0.00260
∗∗ 0.00274∗∗ 0.00340∗∗
(0.000984) (0.000996) (0.00104)
N 4,282 4,282 4,190 4,190 3,867 3,867
R2 0.779 0.709 0.787 0.711 0.815 0.732
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Dependent variable: as indicated on top of each column. Columns (1) and (2) correspond
to a gap of 2 e/ MWh, columns (3) and (4) to a gap of 5 e/ MWh, last two columns to a gap of 8
e/ MWh. Standard errors clustered at the date level.
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which is in units of MWh and where zt ≡ λN,t − λS,t and ∆zt = zt − zt−1. Let ∆K be
the mean of the distribution of ∆Kt. Then, the imputed marginal cost in region N can be
written as
λN,t = λS,t + zt−1 + (bN − bS)∆K. (3)
Figure 12 shows the implied transmission capacities for each of our feasible data points as
a function of the solar output in the South region using Equation 2. The mean of these values
is 3,089 MWh, which is roughly equivalent to twice the capacity of the TenneT transmission
line to Norway or about four times the capacity of a new projected interconnection to the
Netherlands.30 Similarly, the SuedOstlink project between TenneT and 50 Hertz is designed
for a capacity of 2 GW with possibility of an expansion to 4 GW.31 Those projects indicate
that our estimates are well within reasonable values in the industry for this market.
Figure 12: Implied Transmission Capacities
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Notes: Each square represents one of the values obtained using Equation 2. The overall mean is
3,089 MWh.
With Equation 3 in hand, we can re-do the reallocation simulation for different values of
the transmission capacity that replace the value of ∆K in that same equation. For low values
30https://www.tennet.eu/our-grid/international-connections/nordlink/
31https://www.50hertz.com/en/Grid/Griddevelopement/Onshoreprojects/SuedOstLink.
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of this capacity, the marginal cost differential zt is similar in value to the marginal cost in
the previous period. Therefore, we expect that for capacities close to 0, the misallocation of
RES will remain similar to the case of no increase in transmission capacity.
If production in the South is above the load in that region, the excess amount is then
exported to the North whenever this amount is less or equal than the size of the added
transmission capacity. This quantity is valued at the corresponding marginal benefit in
the North at that given point in time. In the absence of the new transmission capacity, the
surpluses in the South would be valued at 0. Since this transmission line could carry electricity
from any source, and is particularly relevant for large RES plants, we use the total amount
of solar capacity installed in Germany in 2016 to conduct our reallocation counterfactuals
instead of only the 10-kW solar capacity as before. In addition, given that most observations
fall within a range of 6,000 MWh in Figure 12 and the projected line capacities in the NEP,
we limit the amount of additional transmission capacity to be no more than 6,000 MW.
Figure 13 shows the gains from reallocating solar as a function of γ for different values
of the capacity constraint ∆K. We find that the gains from reallocating solar capacity
are larger than without this additional transmission capacity.32 For relatively low levels of
γ the gains are increasing as in the case without transmission, i.e. when allocating more
solar in the most productive areas total gains increase as long as the capacity constraint in
the TSO is not binding (solar productionj ≤ loadj). Once solar output is placed in high-
productivity regions, particularly in South TenneT, the excess can be exported to the North
region in case there is sufficient transmission capacity available. If there is no additional
capacity in transmission (the line ∆K = 0), the surplus in solar output from the South
cannot displace further conventional plants and the gains decrease because the reallocation
takes solar capacity from other regions that could have utilized it. As ∆K increases, the
gains exhibit a U-shaped curve. The decreasing part occurs because of the same reasons that
explain the curvature of the ∆K = 0 case. The increasing gains however, reflect the fact
that the excess of solar production in the South valued at its corresponding marginal benefits
32Note that the minimum γ is set at 0.30, which is the maximum of the current total solar capacity in
TSOj divided by total capacity in that TSO. We allow γ to increase up to 0.70, i.e. up to 70% of each TSO’s
capacity can be solar capacity.
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value in the North more than offsets the losses in benefits in the regions where solar capacity
has been decreased.
Figure 13: Gains from Expanding Transmission Capacity
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Notes: Each curve depicts the gains from reallocation at if the transmission capacity between
regions North and South is expanded by the amount indicated to the right of the graph. We show
the complete distribution of gains for different values of ∆K in Appendix Figure A.6.
We now turn to a back-of-the-envelope calculation to compare the costs and benefits
of a new transmission line using our misallocation estimates. We report different scenarios
in Table 7. In line with the above findings, the table shows that additional gains from
reallocation for relatively low levels of γ are small. As γ increases, the interconnection
capacity becomes more valuable. The additional benefits from a capacity expansion of ∆K =
2, 000 MW and with a solar installation rate of γ = 0.66 are 173 million euros relative to
the case where there was no interconnection between the regions but at the same installation
rate. We do not take into account the installation costs of the PV plants that would need to
be subtracted from those gains. The main reason is that we do not have information on how
many years are left in the lifespan of each panel. As a consequence, the benefits-costs ratios
below will be biased upwards.
We compare those gains to the tentative investment cost of the underground transmission
lines that are currently under construction in Germany (SuedOstlink) with that same capacity
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(2,000 MW) and a total length of 530 km. This cost is estimated to be approximately 4.5
billion euros33, which has an annualized value of 135 million euros when using a lifetime
of 40 years34 and an annual discount rate of 1% as in Davis and Hausman [2016]. The
benefit-cost ratios are barely greater than one (1.275), which shows that the investment is
not overwhelmingly beneficial even at large values of γ. On the other hand, if there was a
larger capacity interconnection available (∆K = 6, 000), this ratio increases to approximately
1.6.35 Not surprisingly, the project would lead to larger benefits if traditional overhead lines
were used that are considered to be 10 to 15 times cheaper as underground cables.36 The
benefit-cost analysis shows that additional transmission can be beneficial if there is sufficient
RES capacity reallocated across regions. This is especially important if we were to consider
different types of RES technologies that are more abundant in different regions, as it is the
case for wind and solar in the North and South of Germany.
6 Conclusion
We develop a comprehensive framework to measure misallocation of RES. This is inspired by
the existing rigidity of incentives used to accelerate the adoption of RES. In this paper we
concentrated on the uniform nature of feed-in-tariffs. Our framework consists of three steps:
measuring the marginal benefits from an additional unit of output from RES, using those
valuations to measure the potential gains had an efficient allocation of solar PV installations
existed, and accounting for further gains if expansions in transmission capacities are built.
We apply our framework to the case of Germany and we find evidence of heterogeneous
marginal benefits from increasing renewable capacities even when using a conservative value
33TenneT estimates the total costs between 4 to 5 billion euros. See Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 4 October
2016; last accessed 24 April 2020.
34See industry reports, for instance Xcel Energy Information Sheet on Overhead vs. Underground high-
voltage transmission lines; last accessed 24 April 2020.
35We assume that the three-fold capacity expansion would result in an approximately 77% increase in
total costs, reaching a total investment volume of 8 billion euros, as many of the original investment costs
are fixed and would not need to be scaled up by the same factor. The upper bound for the total cost of the
line would be 3 × 4.5bn euros = 13.5bn euros.
36See Xcel Energy. We assume a cost factor of 1/15 for overhead lines as the delays in planning coupled
with regional protests and lawsuits likely led to an increase in total investment cost.
38
Table 7: Benefit-Cost Analysis for Power Line Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆K (MW) 2,000 6,000
γ 0.37 0.50 0.66 0.37 0.50 0.66
Annual gains
from reallocation [me] 0.630 29.650 173.075 1.500 58.590 394.070
Annualized investment costs 40 years, 1% annual discount
Overhead lines [me] 9.046 9.046 9.046 16.082 16.082 16.082
Underground lines [me] 135.693 135.693 135.693 241.232 241.232 241.232
Benefit-cost ratio
Overhead lines 0.070 3.278 19.132 0.093 3.643 24.504
Underground lines 0.005 0.219 1.275 0.006 0.243 1.634
Notes: Change in gains from reallocation for given γ comparing case of no interconnection (∆K =
0) with interconnection scenarios of 2,000 and 6,000 MW, respectively. Annualized investment costs
for underground lines based on SuedOstLink project, with estimated total costs of 5 billion euros
(TenneT). We assume a total cost of 8 billion euros for the 6,000 MW interconnection. For overhead
lines we assume that total investment cost represents approximately 1/15th of the underground
cables. For both type of high-voltage lines we consider furthermore a 40 year lifespan and a 1%
annual discount rate.
of the social cost of carbon. We find non-negligible gains relative to the current allocation of
solar panels if they had been allocated according to a ranking of the regions by their solar
productivity. In addition, if a new tranmission line were built between the North and the
South regions, this would increase the gains from reallocating solar PV plants for high levels
of solar penetration.
As any economics analysis, ours does not go without caveats. We focused on solar in-
stallations but a more comprehensive study would include wind installations as well. In the
best case scenario, there is no misallocation of wind plants in Germany and the total gains
from misallocation would be only caused by misalignments in incentives for solar plants.
Therefore, we can see our results as a lower bound on the gains from potential misallocation.
Another avenue for future research is to include transmission constraints across the different
regions to be able to value surpluses if they exist. Once again, our results can be seen as
a lower bound for the true gains since we are implicitly valuing excess solar production, if
any, at a marginal benefit of zero. In either of those two cases our framework can be easily
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extended if more data were available.
The efficiency of the allocation of resources is a core paradigm in economics. Our paper
quantifies this efficiency and puts in perspective the costs of simple economics incentives for
technology adoption.
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Appendix
A.1 Details on Data and Simulation Procedure
A.1.1 Simulated frequencies of marginal technologies
To obtain the simulated frequencies presented in Table 1, we rely on fuel price data to
establish a ranking of the different technologies. While there is a world market price for hard
coal, crude oil, and natural gas, lignite is usually not a traded commodity. Rather, lignite
production is part of an integrated supply chain of electricity companies, such as RWE and
Uniper in the case of Germany. To obtain cost estimates for lignite (fuel costs and emission
factors), we rely on a background report published by the German Environmental Ministry in
2017. The simulated merit-order supply curve therefore has the following order, listed from
cheapest to most expensive source: 1) renewables (wind offshore and onshore, solar, hydro
(reservoir, run of river, pumped storage), geothermal, biomass, waste, and other renewables),
2) nuclear, 3) lignite, 4) hard coal, 5) gas, and 6) oil. In the case of 50 Hertz we furthermore
make the assumption that oil in this TSO is always infra-marginal, as electricity production
from ‘oil’ is linked to oil refinery (IKS Schwedt) that produces electricity as a by-product in
its main production process. In line with this information, the electrictiy production profile
for this plant shows no variation over time.
In our analysis, we do abstract from CO2 prices from the European Union Emission
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). While electricity production in Europe is subject to the EU-
ETS, CO2 prices during the time of our analysis (2015-16) have been at an all-time low.
This was likely due to oversupply of emission certificates. In 2015, the average price per
tCO2 was less than 10 e. In 2016, the price decreased further to approximately 5 e/ tCO2.
Given the price differentials in marginal costs in electricity production (fuel input prices),
the low CO2 prices should not have lead to changes in the aggregate merit-order cost curve
(see for instance the industry analysis ”What is the minimum CO2-price in order to affect
the merit-order?”). We therefore refrain from modeling CO2 prices.
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A.1.2 Reallocating RES
For the reallocation exercise in subsection 5.1, we take as given total residential solar capacity
on the last day of our sample (31 December 2016). Similarly, we obtain data for total
installed capacity (all generating units) per TSO. In a next step, we use the individual solar
PV production data, obtained from PVOutput, and multiply them with daily weights that
are TSO specific, in order for the PVOutput data to be representative for the total TSO
production of all 10-kW plants.
We calculate the baseline value (marginal costs + marginal emissions + change in ancillary
service costs) of actual solar PV production using these data. In a next step, we use the
algorithm described in the main text to reallocate solar capacity in line with total allowed
capacity shares (γ). Table Table A.1 shows the proposed reallocation of solar capacity for the
example of γ = 0.1. With these values, the maximum share of solar that can be allocated to
TransnetBW, the TSO with the highest solar productivity, is 2,210 MW (0.1 × 22,096 MW).
This means that the total remaining solar capacity for redistribution to the other TSOs is
3,518 MW. As Amprion has a large total capacity, it can absorb all the remaining residential
solar capacity. In this example 50 Hertz and TenneT remain without solar capacity after the
reallocation.
Table A.1: Solar Reallocation with γ = 0.1
TSO TSO Total TSO Total installed Reallocated solar
Ranking Name capacity [MW] res. solar [MW] capacity [MW]
1 TransnetBW 22,096 1,118 2,210
2 Amprion 66,049 1,780 3,518
3 50 Hertz 22,096 537 0
4 TenneT 64,577 2,294 0
Notes: Total residential solar capacity in Germany 5,728 MW as of December 2016. We assume γ =
0.1 and reallocate solar according to the TSO ranking of average productivity. Total TSO capacity
[MW] refers to total installed capacity (all technologies) in 2016 and total installed residential solar
to all small scale solar in a given TSO.
We calculate the gains from solar PV reallocation for each iteration of γ, adjusting the
impact that solar has on ancillary service costs at each iteration. We take the marginal
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benefits from avoided emissions and avoided operating costs constant within each 15-min
interval. We believe this is a reasonable assumption as we focus on small scale solar capacity
that represents only a small fraction of total demand in each TSO.
To obtain standard errors for our main results in Figure 7, we bootstrap individual solar
PV stations with a fixed number of observations (drawn with replacement). This takes into
account the variability of solar production within the TSO. In addition, in each bootstrap
iteration we add and subtract one standard deviation to the load, which is calculated using
the residuals from projecting load on lagged values and fixed effects to account for uncertainty
in demand.
A.1.3 The value of transmission
We construct simulated supply curves for both North and South TenneT following the ap-
proach described in subsection 5.2, using the following capacity factors for conventional power
plants obtained from the EIA: geothermal: 0.72; hydro: 0.37; nuclear: 0.92; biomass & waste:
0.63; hard coal & lignite: 0.53; natural gas: 0.55; oil: 0.13; and other fuels: 0.5. For wind
(offshore and onshore) as well as solar, we can rely on observed production data as these
technologies are always inframarginal. In a next step, we obtain high frequency data on
plant outages and planned shutdowns for maintenance from ENTSO-E and combine these
data with total installed capacity. We take total installed capacity of conventional power
plants by TSO at the beginning of 2015. This modeling choice is especially relevant for the
production capacities in Bavaria, where a large nuclear plant has been shut down during 2015
and has been replaced by increasing imports through the Austria and Czech interconnections.
As we do not model imports/exports to neighboring countries, this assumption guarantees
that there is sufficient installed capacity in Bavaria to meet demand. We furthermore ob-
tain detailed (15-min) data on total solar PV production in Bavaria, available from TenneT,
which allow us to have realized solar production data for both the North and South regions.
Based on these data, we construct an aggregate supply curve by TSO that we intersect
with aggregate load. We split load for North and South TenneT based on its population
share. These data allow us to construct the marginal costs (λN and λS) as well as marginal
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emissions, for both regions. We report here how the newly calculated λ’s compare to the main
section (Table 3). As North TenneT has more production capacities, we find that the median
cost is lower (17.38 e/MWh) compared to the South region (24.24 e/MWh). Nevertheless,
the two values are highly comparable to the other TSOs. We plot the differences between
λN and λS in Figure A.1. Note that there is a large amount of observations for which the
absolute value of this gap is greater than zero, the exact number of those observations at
different levels of the gap are as described in Table 6 in subsection 5.2.
Figure A.1: Differences in Marginal Costs of Electricity Production: North vs. South
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Notes: Differences of λN and λS based on simulated supply and demand in the two regions.
Finally, with these data at hand, we can simulate the reallocation for different values
of γ and the transmission constraint ∆K. As the reallocation is based on the entire solar
capacity, we rely on aggregate TSO × 15-minute data, with a total of five TSOs. We use
the simulated data on marginal costs and marginal emissions for North and South, as well
as observed solar production in the two entities to calculate the baseline value (assuming all
TSOs are independent). As before, we recalculate changes in the impact on ancillary service
costs, but assume constant gains from marginal costs and marginal emissions. We evaluate
solar production in each TSO at its marginal benefit as long as total solar production is
smaller or equal to total load. If there is excess production in one region, but no possibility
to export, we cap the gains at the load level. Note that this assumption is not as restrictive
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as it looks at first sight given current levels of grid congestion in Germany. When there is
excess production at South, we allow this region to export energy to the North region, in
line with the transmission capacity ∆K. This energy surplus is valued at the simulated λN ,
which is computed following Equation 3.
A.2 Model of Transmission Capacity
This section closely follows Joskow and Tirole [2005] and LaRiviere and Lu [2017]. To ease
the exposition, we suppress the time index. Assume region S is a net exporter to region N
and it exports a quantity Q. Also assume that the marginal costs in each region (λN and
λS) are linear functions of the residual load Rj −Qj and Q,
λN = aN + bN(RN −QN) + bNQ
and
λS = aS + bS(RS −QS) + bSQ.
Note that the coefficient on Q is the same as that of the residual load, this is because the
quantity traded does not change the slope of the supply or the demand for exports, it simply
shifts the curves in a parallel manner to the left or to the right. This is also useful because
we do not observe quantities traded between region N and S.
In the absence of transmission contraints, λN = λS because any arbitrage opportunity
can be mitigated by buying or selling electricity from or to the other region. If there is a
binding transmission constraint of size K we can evaluate the two expressions above at that
transmission level and write the price gap as
λN − λS = aN − aS + bN(RN −QN)− bS(RS −QS) + (bN − bS)K.
Now we add the time index, let zt ≡ λN,t−λS,t and ∆zt ≡ zt− zt−1. Then, the change of the
price gap with respect to the capacity of the transmission line is
∂zt
∂K
= bN − bS
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and an interpretation of such derivative is that
∆Kt =
∆zt
bN − bS ,
from which we can infer the size of the capacity constraint given a change in the marginal
cost difference between the two regions and the slopes of demand and supply of net exports.
This process gives a distribution of the increments in the transmission capacity at each t for
which zt is above a pre-determined threshold.
Observe that ∆Kt = 0 if either zt = zt−1 > 0 or if zt = zt−1 = 0. Therefore, by using the
expression for ∆Kt it is not possible to distinguish whether a value of 0 for the transmission
capacity is due to observing the same price gap in two consecutive periods or because the
price gap was indeed zero in two consecutive periods. This calls for using an aggregation of
the different values of ∆Kt, let ∆K be the mean of that distribution. Then, the imputed
marginal cost in region N can be written as
λN,t = λS,t + zt−1 + (bN − bS)∆K.
To estimate the parameters bN and bS we need exogenous variation and fixed-effects that
solve the natural endogeneity problem between residual demand (Rj −Qj) and the marginal
costs (λj). To that end we use the load in region k to estimate the slope in region j since
once the transmission constraint is being used at full capacity, any additional load in k has no
effect on the production costs in region j. Note that since we do not observe the quantities
traded, we omit the terms bNQ and bSQ from the estimation equations. This discussion
motivates the following equations that we estimate in the main text,
E[λN ] = aN + bN(RN −QN) + cNQS + FEs
E[λS] = aS + bS(RS −QS) + cSQN + FEs.
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A.3 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.2: Ancillary Costs on Solar and Load by Cluster of Load Profile
(1) (2) (3)
cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 3
solar -4.153∗∗∗ 6.756∗∗∗ 0.553
(0.946) (0.967) (0.708)
solar2 0.000564∗∗∗ 0.000187 0.000678∗∗∗
(0.000124) (0.000174) (0.000125)
solar3 1.06e-08 -6.33e-08∗∗∗ -1.54e-08∗
(1.12e-08) (1.08e-08) (6.54e-09)
load -0.259 0.782 -0.930∗
(0.974) (0.930) (0.449)
load2 0.000106 0.000110 0.000177∗∗∗
(0.0000647) (0.0000736) (0.0000385)
load3 -2.11e-09 -5.08e-09∗∗ -4.05e-09∗∗∗
(1.24e-09) (1.84e-09) (9.01e-10)
solar × load 0.000186 -0.00120∗∗∗ -0.000331∗∗∗
(0.000126) (0.000127) (0.0000726)
solar × load2 1.81e-09 3.77e-08∗∗∗ 1.10e-08∗∗∗
(3.67e-09) (4.78e-09) (2.34e-09)
solar2× load -3.94e-08∗∗∗ 4.84e-08∗∗∗ -2.12e-08∗∗∗
(6.07e-09) (9.78e-09) (5.55e-09)
FE X X X
N 58,555 43,008 47,218
R2 0.0750 0.0651 0.0653
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Dependent variable: ancillary costs. Each column corresponds to one of the clusters and
each regression includes two-way fixed effects of TSO, hour of the day, day of the week, month, and
year. In all regressions we use only time observations for which the solar output is positive.
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Table A.3: Ancillary Costs on Solar and Load by Pooling All Observations
(1) (2)
solar 0.0166 -1.423∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.391)
solar2 0.0000492∗∗∗ 0.000613∗∗∗
(0.0000138) (0.0000690)
load 0.354∗∗ 0.537∗
(0.110) (0.241)
load2 0.00000909∗∗ 3.76e-08
(0.00000303) (0.0000166)
solar × load -0.0000315∗∗∗ -0.0000803∗
(0.00000801) (0.0000406)
solar3 -2.03e-08∗∗∗
(4.78e-09)
load3 6.13e-11
(3.54e-10)
solar × load2 4.25e-09∗∗∗
(1.16e-09)
solar 2× load -1.67e-08∗∗∗
(2.84e-09)
FE X X
N 148,781 148,781
R2 0.0463 0.0468
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Using observations for which there is positive solar production.
Table A.4: Effect of Solar Output on Ancillary Services Pooling All Observations
∂AS/∂R
TSO quadratic cubic
50Hertz -0.14 -0.60
Amprion -0.51 -0.56
TenneT -0.30 -0.61
TransnetBW -0.11 0.82
Notes: Each number is the value of ∂AS/∂R, in e/ MWh, obtained using the coefficients in
Table A.3 and evaluated at the mean solar output and the mean load.
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Table A.5: Simulated Frequencies of Marginal Technologies (by TSO)
TSO: 50 Hertz
Source Freq. Percent
Natural Gas 69,954 99.68
Hard Coal 152 0.22
Hydro: River 46 0.07
Hydro: Pumped storage 24 0.03
TSO: Amprion
Source Freq. Percent
Natural Gas 68,868 98.14
Hard Coal 1,308 1.86
TSO: TenneT
Source Freq. Percent
Hard Coal 41,330 58.89
Natural Gas 27,157 38.70
Oil 1,030 1.47
Brown Coal / Lignite 655 0.93
Biomass 4 0.01
TSO: TransnetBW
Source Freq. Percent
Hard Coal 57,975 82.61
Natural gas 6,522 9.29
Nuclear 3,522 5.02
Oil 2,157 3.07
Notes: For each 15-minute interval we compute the marginal cost of each of the technologies shown
in the tables and sort them from lowest to highest marginal cost to obtain the system’s marginal cost
curve. Notice that the marginal cost for fossil fuels can change over time as we use fuel prices to con-
struct this curve. Finally, we select the technology that corresponds to the point in the marginal cost
curve that intersects the net load in that time interval. TenneT and TransnetBW display large fre-
quencies for hard coal being the marginal technology. This has been observed also by market analysts
(see https://timera-energy.com/german-recession-power-prices-generation-margins/).
Figure A.2: Installed Solar Capacity (< 10 kW installations)
Residential	solar	capacity	(MW)
0.3	-	7.7
7.7	-	15.0
15.0	-	22.3
22.3	-	29.7
29.7	-	37.0
37.0	-	44.3
44.3	-	51.6
51.6	-	59.0
Legend
Notes: Cumulative solar capacity (Dec 2016) for residential solar installations, with a maximum
installed capacity of 10 kW. Darker areas represent more installed solar capacity.
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Figure A.3: Technology Portfolio Mix by TSO, Production 2015-16
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Notes: Average technology shares in electricity production 2015-16. Source: ENTSO-E.
Figure A.4: Effect of Solar Output on Ancillary Services Costs
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Notes: Functions obtained using the coefficients from the main specification of the ancillary services
costs regressions.
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Figure A.5: Planned Extension of High Voltage Network
Notes: Net Development Plan Germany (2030). Source: https://www.netzentwicklungsplan.
de/de/projekte/projekte-nep-2030-2019
Figure A.6: Gains from Expanding Transmission Capacity
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Notes: The surface depicts the gains from reallocation if the transmission capacity between regions
N and S is expanded by the amount indicated by ∆K.
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